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Sexual Orientation Differences in Attitudes about Sexuality, Race, and Gender 
By Eric Anthony Grollman 
 
ABSTRACT 
Researchers have extensively documented sociodemographic predictors of race and gender 
attitudes, and the mechanisms through which such attitudes are formed and change. Despite its 
growing recognition as an important status characteristic, sexual orientation has received little 
attention as a predictor of Americans’ race and gender attitudes. Using nationally representative 
data from the American National Election Survey 2012 Time Series Study, I compare 
heterosexuals’ and lesbian, gay, and bisexual (LGB) people’s attitudes about sexuality, race, and 
gender. For most attitudes, LGB people hold significantly more liberal attitudes about sexuality, 
race, and gender than do heterosexuals, even upon controlling for other powerful 
sociodemographic predictors of social attitudes. However, a substantial proportion of these 
sexual orientation gaps in attitudes – especially about race and gender – are explained by LGB 
people’s relatively liberal political ideology. The findings provide evidence for the necessity of 
incorporating sexual orientation in future assessments of Americans’ social and political 
attitudes. 
(Word Count: 150) 
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Sexual Orientation Differences in Attitudes about Sexuality, Race, and Gender 
 
“The dirty little secret about the homosexual population is that white gay people 
are just as racist as white straight people.” 
(Boykin 1996: 234) 
 
“Gay culture, [gay activists say], is better because it is less sexist, less classist, 
and less racist than heterosexual culture.” 
(Savin-Williams 2005: 17) 
 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
Many scholars and activists have speculated about the race and gender attitudes of lesbian, gay, 
and bisexual (LGB) people relative to the views of heterosexuals. Anecdotal accounts, such as 
the quotes at the opening of this article, have presented two contradictory predictions about the 
views of LGB people. Some have suggested that LGB people share the views of their 
heterosexual counterparts, specifically in terms of race and gender attitudes (Smith 1999; 
Taywaditep 2001). Others have argued that LGB culture, organizations, and movements are less 
likely to harbor prejudice toward other oppressed groups due to their own marginalized status in 
society (Savin-Williams 2005). However, little research has empirically examined the effect of 
sexual orientation on Americans’ race and gender attitudes. Indeed, although sexual orientation 
is recognized as an important status characteristic (Johnson 1995; Webster and Hysom 1998), 
one that likely influences individuals’ attitudes and values (Mucciaroni 2011), it is rarely 
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considered in attitudinal research. Scholars have long investigated attitudes toward LGB people, 
while consistently overlooking the attitudes of LGB people.  
The present study uses data from the American National Election Survey (ANES) 2012 
Time Series Study, a nationally representative sample of Americans ages 18 and older, to 
investigate sexual orientation differences in attitudes regarding sexuality, race, and gender. 
Specifically, this paper investigates two research questions. First, given LGB people’s 
marginalized status in society, do they hold more liberal attitudes toward Black Americans and 
women, as well as themselves, than their heterosexual counterparts? Second, to what extent are 
potential sexual orientation gaps in these attitudes explained by sexual orientation differences in 
education, religion, and/or political ideology?  
2. SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND ATTITUDES: COMPETING EXPECTATIONS 
In addition to documenting trends in sexuality, race, and gender attitudes over time, social 
scientists have extensively investigated sociodemographic differences in, as well as other social 
determinants of, such attitudes (e.g., Brooks and Bolzendahl 2004, Loftus 2001). Prior research 
suggests that socioeconomic status (especially education), age, religion, region of the country, 
and urbanicity are consistent predictors of social attitudes (Bolzendahl and Myers 2004; Carter 
and Carter 2014; Cunningham et al. 2005; Hunt 2007). Studies on racial differences in gender 
and sexuality attitudes, and gender differences in race attitudes have yielded mixed findings 
(Hughes and Tuch 2003; Kane 2000; Kane and Whipkey 2009; Loftus 2001). While such 
research is extensive, scholars have rarely considered the effect of sexual orientation on 
Americans’ social attitudes. In addition, though many of these sociodemographic characteristics 
also predict attitudes toward lesbian women and gay men (Andersen and Fetner 2008; Loftus 
2001; Powell et al. 2010), research on sexuality attitudes almost exclusively focuses on LGB 
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people as the targets of such attitudes held among heterosexuals. LGB people’s own sexuality 
attitudes, as well as their race and gender attitudes have been understudied.  
Generally, most studies on LGB people’s social attitudes lack a comparable heterosexual 
sample (e.g., Harr and Kane 2008; Hirsch and Rollins 2007; Rollins and Hirsch 2003) and/or are 
limited to attitudes toward themselves or specific LGB subgroups (e.g., Cragun and Sumerau 
2015; Doan, Loehr, and Miller 2014; Stone 2009). Relying on small, non-representative samples, 
some early studies on sexual orientation differences in race and gender attitudes yield mixed 
findings. While some studies have found no differences between sexual minorities and 
heterosexuals in social attitudes in general (Bailey 1999; Bell and Weinberg 1978; Saghir and 
Robins 1973), others suggest LGB people may be more tolerant toward Black Americans, 
women, and other stigmatized groups (Beran et al. 1992; Corbett, Troiden, and Dodder 1977; 
Lalonde, Doan, and Patterson 2000; McDonald and Moore 1978). More recently, political 
scientists have used election data and large surveys to examine differences in LGB and 
heterosexuals’ political attitudes and behaviors (Egan 2012; Hertzog 1996; Lewis, Rogers, and 
Sherrill 2011). This research suggests that LGB people are politically distinct from their 
heterosexual counterparts, finding, in particular, that they are overwhelmingly liberal (Egan 
2012; Hertzog 1996; Schaffner and Senic 2006). Such research has not yet extended beyond a 
limited range of political attitudes. No study to date has used nationally representative data to 
examine sexual orientation differences in social attitudes – in the present case, attitudes toward 
Black Americans and women.  
The present study offers an exploratory analysis of sexual orientation differences in 
attitudes about sexuality, race, and gender using nationally representative data. I draw from two 
sources to propose possible patterns for the association between sexual orientation and 
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individuals’ views on sexuality, race, and gender: first, from prior research on sociodemographic 
(especially racial and gender) differences in social attitudes; and, second, from prior scholarship 
on the unique social, political, and demographic profile of LGB Americans. Based on this prior 
research, there exist three possibilities for the effect of sexual orientation and attitudes: (1) no 
sexual orientation differences in sexuality, race, and gender attitudes, (2) LGB people’s 
significantly more liberal sexuality, but not race or gender, attitudes, and, (3) LGB people’s 
significantly more liberal attitudes toward Black Americans and women, as well as themselves.  
2.1 No Significant Sexual Orientation Differences in Attitudes 
The first possible association between sexual orientation and attitudes regarding 
sexuality, race, and gender is that there is little to no difference between heterosexuals’ and 
sexual minorities’ views. One’s sexual orientation may simply have no influence on one’s 
attitudes toward LGB people, Black Americans, and women, particularly upon controlling for 
the effects of other powerful sociodemographic predictors of such attitudes. Prior research on 
attitudes, particularly on gender attitudes, has identified primary socialization through one’s 
family as a key mechanism through which one develops particular attitudes (Liao and Cai 1995; 
Maio et al. 2003). Unlike racial socialization within families of color (Brown and Lesane-Brown 
2006), for example, there is little evidence that socialization processes that center on non-
heterosexuality exist (Epstein 1992; Stacey and Biblarz 2001). Rather, LGB and heterosexual 
people alike are overwhelmingly reared in predominantly heterosexual families (Gonsiorek 
1995; Sherrill 1996). Parenting practices tend to be heteronormative – that is, these practices 
treat heterosexuality as normal, natural, and taken-for-granted, while homosexuality and 
bisexuality are seen as deviant or are otherwise invisible (Kane 2006; Martin 2009). Other agents 
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of socialization, including schools and the media, further contribute to the heteronormative 
socialization of children (Martin and Kazyak 2009; Myers and Raymond 2010).  
Further, secondary socialization into distinct lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and 
queer (LGBTQ) communities tends to occur later in life, if at all, and is less formative than 
primary (heteronormative) socialization (Epstein 1992). Unlike the other predictors of sexuality, 
race, and gender attitudes that are established in early life, namely race and ethnicity, gender, 
religion, and political ideology, one’s sexual orientation develops in early adolescence or 
adulthood – especially for non-heterosexuals (Sherrill 1996). Sexual minority youth tend to have 
few connections with other sexual minorities; rather, their friendships are largely with 
heterosexual youth of their same race and grade level in school (Ueno 2005 and 2010). Only one 
in four LGB people have ever lived in predominantly LGBTQ neighborhoods (Pew Research 
Center 2013), and such communities have become less segregated and distinctive from the rest 
of the predominantly heterosexual society (Ghaziani 2014). Thus, these sexual orientation-based 
socialization processes come up against norms, values, and a sense of self that have already been 
established. Further, scholars have suggested that LGBTQ communities, organizations, and 
social movements are, at times, divided by race and ethnicity, gender, and class (Armstrong 
2002; Battle et al. 2002; Barrett and Pollack 2005; Taywaditep 2001; Ward 2008). Thus, while 
important, a significant effect of sexual orientation on sexuality, race, and gender attitudes at the 
baseline may be explained by other sociodemographic characteristics, namely socioeconomic 
status, age, and religion (Bailey 1999; Herek et al. 2010; Pew Research Center 2013). 
Hypothesis 1: There are no significant sexual orientation differences in sexuality, 
race, and gender attitudes, particularly upon controlling for other 
sociodemographic characteristics. 
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2.2 Significant Sexual Orientation Differences in Sexuality Attitudes Only 
In the second possibility for the association between sexual orientation and attitudes, the 
stigmatized status of LGB people may lead them to hold sexuality, but not race or gender, 
attitudes that are distinct from those of heterosexuals. Though declining, there remains a high 
level of antipathy toward sexual minorities in the US (Andersen and Fetner 2008; Loftus 2001; 
Powell et al. 2010). A sizeable minority of Americans, including particular segments of the 
population, strongly opposes LGBTQ rights (e.g., same-sex marriage, civil liberties) (Adamczyk 
and Pit 2009; Kenneavy 2012; Sherkat et al. 2011). LGB people face pervasive interpersonal 
discrimination and violence (Herek 2009; Tilcsik 2011), which is further compounded by 
institutional discrimination (Levitt et al. 2008). For many, experiences of victimization begin in 
childhood and adolescence (Freidman et al. 2008; Hatzenbuehler 2011). As a consequence of the 
prejudice, discrimination, and violence they face, LGB people may have a unique view of the 
social world, or “double consciousness” (DuBois 1903; Lewis et al. 2011; Orne 2013). Drawing 
upon the underdog thesis, LGB people may be keenly aware and critical of bi- and homophobic 
oppression, and may hold more favorable attitudes toward social policies that eliminate it (Davis 
and Robinson 1991; Robinson 1983; Robinson and Bell 1978).  
Yet, the liberalizing effect of one’s “underdog” status as a sexual minority may be limited 
to attitudes about LGB people, relationships, and rights; LGB Americans may be 
indistinguishable from heterosexuals in terms of attitudes toward Black Americans and women. 
In fact, in its original conceptualization, the underdog thesis was considered a manifestation of 
self-interest (Robinson and Bell 1978). That is, the liberal attitudes of marginalized individuals 
may be driven by their interest in promoting their own equal status, while the more conservative 
attitudes of members of privileged groups may be driven by their interest in maintaining the 
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status quo (Bolzendahl and Myers 2004; Davis 2005; Kane and Whipkey 2009). Indeed, early 
work using non-representative samples suggests that sexual minorities’ attitudes may be 
indistinguishable from those of heterosexuals (Bailey 1999; Bell and Weinberg 1978; Connell 
1992; Saghir and Robins 1973). These findings are similar to those on Black Americans’ and 
women’s greater awareness of social inequality, yet greater intolerance toward other stigmatized 
groups (e.g., atheists, the homeless) (Edgell, Gerteis, and Hartmann 2006; Lee, Farrell, Link 
2004). As such, the effect of sexual orientation may be limited to the domain of sexuality 
attitudes, perhaps driven by LGB people’s own self-interest (Schaffner and Senic 2006).  
Hypothesis 2: LGB Americans hold significantly more liberal sexuality attitudes 
than their heterosexual counterparts; however, there are no sexual orientation 
differences in race and gender attitudes. 
2.3 Significant Sexual Orientation Differences in Sexuality, Race, and Gender Attitudes 
In the third possible effect of sexual orientation on sexuality, race, and gender attitudes, 
the “underdog” status of LGB people may lead them to hold more liberal attitudes toward 
themselves, as well as Black Americans and women. That is, they may be more likely than 
heterosexuals to acknowledge pervasive racist and sexist discrimination, favor policies to redress 
such discrimination, and feel warmth and empathy toward Black people and women. Some early 
work suggests that sexual minorities report more favorable attitudes toward and greater 
awareness of discrimination against racial and ethnic minorities and women, among other 
stigmatized groups (Beran et al. 1992; Corbett et al. 1977; Lalonde et al. 2000; McDonald and 
Moore 1978). Other scholars have found that LGB identified people are more pro-feminist and 
more likely to support legal access to abortion services than are heterosexual identified people 
(Hertzog 1996; Rothblum 2011; Schaffner and Senic 2006). There exists a distinct LGBTQ 
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culture, containing a set of shared values, including the explicit celebration of diversity within 
LGBTQ communities, and coalitions with other marginalized communities (Armstrong 2002; 
Bernstein 2002; D’Emilio 2004; Lewis et al. 2011; Ward 2008). Thus, the results may suggest 
that LGB people, indeed, hold more liberal race and gender attitudes, as well as those about 
sexuality, than do heterosexuals. 
Hypothesis 3: LGB Americans hold significantly more liberal sexuality, race, and gender 
attitudes than heterosexuals, net of other sociodemographic predictors of such attitudes. 
2.4 Possible Explanations for Sexual Orientation Gaps in Attitudes 
The present study also explores possible mechanisms that produce sexual orientation 
differences in sexuality, race, and gender attitudes, specifically education, religion, and political 
ideology. Prior research has documented a number of factors that shape Americans’ attitudes, 
particularly with regard to race and gender: group position and group threat, self-interest, 
contact, exposure, and socialization (Bolzendahl and Myers 2004; Davis and Greenstein 2009; 
Hughes and Tuch 2003; Kane and Whipkey 2009). However, since these predictors of attitudes 
overwhelmingly reflect the lives of heterosexual people, they are less useful for understanding 
the attitudes of sexual minorities. For example, it is unclear whether marriage and one’s spouse’s 
work status affects LGB individuals’ gender attitudes in the same ways and to the same extent as 
they do heterosexuals’ attitudes (Bolzendahl and Myers 2004; Davis and Greenstein 2009). 
Indeed, this oversight reflects a broader trend in attitudinal research on the predictors of and 
mechanisms that drive privileged group members’ attitudes (Hunt 2004; Samson 2012). 
 Sexual orientation differences in attitudes could stem, in part, from differences in the 
demographic profiles of heterosexual and LGB Americans. In particular, LGB people tend to be 
more highly educated, less religious, and more politically liberal than general (heterosexual) 
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population (Gates 2015; Pew Research Center 2013). Historically, religion has played a central 
role in the opposition to LGBTQ rights and in bi- and homophobic prejudice (Fetner 2008; 
Loftus 2001; Sherkat et al. 2011). LGB people are generally less religious, and more likely than 
heterosexuals to switch to a more liberal religion or to reject religion all together in adulthood 
(Herek et al. 2010; Lewis et al. 2004; Pew Research Center 2013; Smith and Haider-Markel 
2002). Political scientists have found that LGB people overwhelmingly self-identify as liberal, 
with the majority of LGB voters supporting Democratic candidates (Bailey 1999; Herzog 1996; 
Lewis et al. 2011; Smith and Haider-Markel 2002). In addition, LGB people tend to hold more 
liberal positions than heterosexuals on war, environmental issues, and domestic spending, and 
are more likely to reject traditional values regarding marriage and family (Bailey 1999; Egan 
2012; Hertzog 1996; Meier, Hull, and Ortyl 2009). 
Education, religion, and political orientation reflect three documented mechanisms of 
sexuality, race, and gender attitudes, namely explaining racial and gender differences in such 
attitudes (Bolzendahl and Myers 2004; Hunt 2007; Loftus 2001). For example, Black Americans 
tend to be more conservative than their white counterparts on issues that are guided by religiosity 
(e.g., abortion; Davis 2005). LGB people’s greater education, relatively low religiosity, and 
greater liberalism may explain, in part, their more liberal sexuality, race, and gender attitudes. 
Hypothesis 4: Significant sexual orientation differences in sexuality, race, and 
gender attitudes are explained, in large part, by sexual orientation differences in 
education, religion, and political ideology. 
Using data from the ANES 2012 Time Series Study, I examine whether lesbian, gay, and 
bisexual people hold more liberal sexuality, race, and gender attitudes than heterosexuals. Using 
this nationally representative data, I investigate whether differences found between heterosexual 
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and LGB people’s attitudes hold net of the effects of other sociodemographic predictors of 
attitudes: gender, race and ethnicity, household income, age, marital/partner status, and region of 
the country. In addition, I assess the extent to which three documented mechanisms that drive 
social attitudes – education, religion, and political ideology – explain potential sexual orientation 
gaps in sexuality, race, and gender attitudes. 
4. METHODS 
4.1 Data 
The present study uses data from the American National Election Survey (ANES) 2012 Time 
Series Study (see ANES 2014 for a full description of the survey’s methodology and questions). 
The ANES is a national, full probability pre- and post-election survey of non-institutionalized 
US citizens ages 18 years or older, conducted by the University of Michigan Center of Political 
Studies. The survey has been conducted during years of presidential elections since 1948, 
assessing Americans’ voting behaviors, as well as their political and social attitudes. The ANES 
is an ideal source of data for the present paper given its large, nationally representative sample, 
wide variety of measures of sexuality, race, and gender attitudes, and inclusion of information 
about respondents’ sexual orientation. 
 In 2012, the ANES was administered to 5,916 respondents through two modes: face-to-
face interviews with 2,054 US eligible voters (38 percent response rate), and an Internet survey 
with 3,860 US eligible voters (2 percent response rate). Respondents who completed face-to-face 
interviews were selected through address-based, stratified, multistage cluster sampling, with 
oversamples of Black and Hispanic Americans. These interviews were supplemented with a 
panel of respondents drawn from GfK, which was recruited through address-based sampling and 
random-digit dialing; prospective panelists were offered free Internet service and hardware if 
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they did not already have Internet access. Appendix A displays the descriptive statistics for the 
ANES sample, including bivariate differences between respondents who completed the face-to-
face interviews and those who completed the Internet survey. Sample weights (described below) 
account for all but one difference between the subsamples (i.e., religious attendance). All 
multivariate analyses in the present paper include a control for survey version to account for 
these remaining differences between the subsamples. 
The ANES was administered in two parts, including the pre-election section (beginning 
two months prior to the 2012 presidential election) and the post-election section (conducted from 
November 7, 2012 through January 2013).1 Analyses for the present study are restricted to 
respondents who completed both the pre- and post-election surveys. Listwise deletion for 
missing information on independent and dependent variables is employed, yielding a final 
sample of 4,526 respondents.2 Analyses are based on weighted data, which account for 
probability of household selection, selection within the household, nonresponse, and random 
sampling error; sample weights also adjust for differences between the ANES sample and the US 
population on key sociodemographic characteristics (i.e., race, ethnicity, gender, education, 
income, homeownership, age, marital status, region, urbanicity, and nativity). 
                                                 
1 The Internet version of the survey was administered as two smaller pre-election surveys and 
two smaller post-election surveys, thus totaling four short surveys. 
2 Data for these variables are systematically missing in a few ways. However, analyses using 
multiple imputations for missing data on independent variables yield generally similar results to 
those presented using listwise deletion (available upon request).  
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4.2 Measures 
 Sexuality, Race, and Gender Attitudes. The ANES includes a number of items regarding 
respondents’ attitudes toward women and sexual and racial minorities. Sexuality attitudes 
include four items: warmth toward lesbians and gay men, recognition of homophobic 
discrimination, support for legal recognition of same-sex couples, and support for legally 
allowing same-sex couples to adopt children. I assess eleven items regarding attitudes toward 
Black Americans, including support for Affirmative Action, recognition of racist discrimination 
and inequality, warmth and feelings toward Black Americans, and racial resentment. Finally, 
gender attitudes include twelve items, which assess views on traditional gender roles, recognition 
of sexist discrimination, and support for legal access to abortion services. All sexuality, racial, 
and gender attitudinal items are coded with higher values representing liberal or favorable 
responses and lower values representing conservative or unfavorable responses. Appendix B 
provides the means, standard deviations, and metrics for these attitudinal outcomes.3 
                                                 
3 Alternative ways of measuring variables were considered for three gender attitudinal outcomes 
(analyses available upon request). Analyses assessing a four-point version of the belief that 
working mothers can establish warm and secure relationships with their children (0=a great deal 
harder; 4=neither easier nor harder/easier), which combines the responses “neither easier nor 
harder,” “slightly easier,” “somewhat easier,” and “a great deal easier” into a single category, 
yield similar results to those using the original seven-point version (0=a great deal harder; 6=a 
great deal easier). Analyses that use a version of the item regarding opposition to restrictions on 
abortion (0-2) that combine “legal abortion for reasons other than rape, incest, or danger” and 
“legal abortion as a matter of personal choice” into a single category yield similar results to those 
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 Sexual Orientation. ANES respondents were asked the following question to collect 
information regarding sexual orientation: “Do you consider yourself to be heterosexual or 
straight, homosexual or gay/lesbian, or bisexual?” I measure sexual orientation using a 
dichotomous variable, wherein lesbian, gay, and bisexual (LGB) identified respondents are 
coded as 1 and heterosexual identified respondents are coded as 0.4 I collapse lesbian/gay and 
bisexual respondents into a single group because of their shared status and experiences as sexual 
minorities and their small subsample sizes within the ANES.5 
                                                 
using the original variable (0-3). Finally, analyses that include an additional item in the abortion 
scale (=.875) – support for legalized abortion if the reason is because the child is the “wrong” 
sex – are similar to those presented excluding this item from the scale (=.881); maximum 
likelihood factor analyses yield a single factor, on which the excluded item weakly loads. 
4 Three percent of respondents (n=128) are missing exclusively on sexual orientation, including 
40 respondents who responded, “don’t know.” 
5 Supplemental analyses using dichotomous variables for bisexuals (yes=1) and lesbians and 
gays (yes=1), compared to heterosexuals, reveal a number of interesting patterns (available upon 
request). On six items, lesbian women and gay men, but not bisexuals, are significantly more 
liberal than heterosexuals, including feeling sympathy for Black people (Models 1-2), admiring 
Black people (all three models), believing that a working mother can form a warm bond with her 
children (Models 1-2), and favoring legal abortion (Models 1-2). Lesbian and gay respondents 
are significantly more liberal than both bisexuals and heterosexuals on four attitudinal items 
regarding beliefs about gender: it is worse for a family if the man works and the woman is a 
homemaker (all three models); men have more opportunities to advance than do women (all 
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 Sociodemographic Controls. To examine the effect of sexual orientation on sexuality, 
race, and gender attitudes, I control for other variables that research has shown to influence these 
and other social attitudes. I include dichotomous variables to measure race and ethnicity, 
compared to non-Hispanic whites (1=yes for each): non-Hispanic Black, Latina/o, and other 
nonwhites. Gender is measured using a dichotomous variable (woman=1, man=0). I measure 
income using the natural logarithm of respondents’ annual household income (M=10.60 
[approximately $42,500]). Age is measured in years, ranging from 18 to 90 and older (M=47.5).6 
I measure marital or partner status using a binary indicator for respondent’s current relationship 
                                                 
three models); women demand equal treatment, not special rights (Models 1-2); and, women do 
not cause more problems by complaining about sexist discrimination (Models 1-2). On one 
items, a significant rank-order emerges, wherein lesbians and gays are the most liberal, followed 
by bisexuals, followed by heterosexuals: warmth toward gays and lesbians (all three models). 
However, given the small subsample sizes of lesbian women and gay men (n=110) and bisexual 
people (n=93), these patterns should be interpreted with caution. 
6 The original ANES measure of household income is a categorical variable, ranging from under 
$5,000 (0) to  $250,000 or more (27). The present paper uses a transformed version of this 
variable, for which the natural logarithm of the midpoint of each range represents the original 
category (7.824-12.492). For example, I recoded 24 ($125,000-$149,999) to the natural 
logarithm of $137,500 (or 11.831). However, supplemental analyses using the original 
categorical measure of household income are similar to those presented (available upon request). 
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status (currently married or partnered=1). Region of the country is measured using a dichotomous 
variable for respondents living in the US South (yes=1) compared to the rest of the country.7  
 Potential Mechanisms. To explore which social factors drive the potential relationships 
between sexual orientation and attitudes, I control for three possible mediating variables that 
have been shown to influence social attitudes. Education is a measure of the highest degree 
respondents have earned, ranging from less than high school (0) to a graduate degree (4) 
(M=1.92 [some college=2]). I measure religious attendance using an ordinal variable of the 
frequency with which respondents attend religious services, apart from weddings, baptisms, and 
funerals, ranging from never (0) to more than once per week (5) (M=1.62).8 Finally, political 
ideology is a measure of the extent to which respondents identify as politically liberal, ranging 
from 0 (extremely conservative) to 6 (extremely liberal) (M=2.76 [moderate=3]).9 
4.3 Analysis Plan  
                                                 
7 Supplemental analyses using dichotomous variables for all four regions, including West, North 
Central, and South, compared to Northeast, yield similar results (available upon request). 
8 Supplemental analyses using biblical literalism (0=actual word of God; 2=not the word of God) 
yield results that are generally similar to those to those presented (available upon request). 
9 Supplemental analyses using political party affiliation (0=strong Republican; 6=strong 
Democrat) yield similar results, with four exceptions. The effects of sexual orientation remain 
significant – wherein LGB respondents hold more liberal views – in Models 3 for the following 
items: the belief that whites have too much control in US politics, sympathy for Black people, 
symbolic racism, and the belief that media should pay more attention to sexist discrimination. 
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 The analyses presented here include the following steps, after providing descriptive 
statistics for the ANES sample. First, I estimate the effect of sexual orientation on each sexuality, 
race, and gender attitudinal item, net of survey version. Second, I estimate the effects of sexual 
orientation on each item, controlling for race and ethnicity, gender, household income, age, 
marital/partner status, and region of the country. In particular, this step examines whether 
significant effects of sexual orientation on sexuality, race, and gender attitudes are accounted for 
by other important sociodemographic characteristics. The third set of multivariate models 
estimate the effects of sexual orientation with additional controls for education, religious 
attendance, and political ideology. In addition, I use post-hoc Sobel tests (Sobel 1982) to assess 
whether education, religious attendance, and/or political ideology mediate the effects of sexual 
orientation on outcomes for which there are significant sexual orientation gaps. This final step 
will assess the extent to which these potential mechanisms explain significant differences in 
LGB and heterosexual respondents’ sexuality, race, and gender attitudes. Appropriate regression 
modeling is used for the multivariate analyses: ordinary least squares (OLS) regression for 
additives scales that were created; binary logistic regression for binary outcomes; and, ordered 
logistic regression for ordinal outcomes.  
5. RESULTS 
5.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics for the entire ANES sample, as well as the heterosexual 
and LGB subsamples. Similar to other national estimates, 4 percent of ANES respondents 
identify as lesbian, gay, or bisexual (Gates 2011 and 2015; Gates and Newport 2012b). Bivariate 
regression analyses reveal a few sociodemographic differences between LGB and heterosexual 
ANES respondents. Consistent with past research, LGB respondents in this sample are younger, 
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live in households with less income, attend religious services less frequently, and are more 
politically liberal than heterosexuals (Gates 2015; Herek et al. 2010; Pew Research Center 2013; 
Gates and Newport 2012a). LGB people are also less likely to be currently married or partnered 
than are heterosexual people. 
 [INSERT TABLE 1 HERE] 
Table 1 also provides descriptive statistics for two sexual minority subgroups, bisexual 
respondents and lesbian and gay respondents, which mirror prior estimates (Gates 2014; Pew 
Research Center 2013). Women are less likely to identify as lesbian/gay than bisexual or 
heterosexual (also see Gates 2015). The aforementioned significant household income difference 
between heterosexual and LGB people is unique to bisexual respondents. In addition, lesbians 
and gays report significantly more education, on average, than do heterosexuals and bisexuals 
(also see Pew Research Center 2013 and Gates and Newport 2012a). Finally, lesbians and gays, 
bisexuals, and heterosexuals are rank-ordered on age, wherein bisexuals are the youngest, 
followed by lesbians and gay men, and then heterosexuals. Similarly, there is a rank-order on 
political ideology, wherein lesbians and gays are the most liberal, followed by bisexuals, and 
then heterosexuals. These sexual orientation differences will be accounted for in multivariate 
regression analyses of sexuality, race, and gender attitudes that control for these 
sociodemographic characteristics. 
5.2 Sexuality Attitudes 
In the first set of multivariate analyses, I focus on the association between sexual orientation and 
sexuality attitudes to assess whether LGB respondents differ from heterosexuals, at least in the 
domain of attitudes toward themselves. Table 2 presents the regression estimates for the first two 
sexuality attitudinal outcomes, including regression estimates for the feeling thermometer for gay 
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men and lesbian women and ordered logistic odds ratios for the perceived amount of 
discrimination toward lesbian women and gay men in the US. Table 3 presents the ordered 
logistic odds ratios for support for legal recognition of same-sex relationships and favoring legal 
adoption of children for same-sex couples. For each attitudinal outcome, Model 1 displays the 
results for the effect of sexual orientation, controlling for survey version. Models 2 add 
sociodemographic controls, including respondents’ gender, race and ethnicity, household 
income, age, marital/partner status, and region of the country. Finally, in Models 3, I add 
controls for education, religious attendance, and political ideology.  
[INSERT TABLE 2 HERE] 
In Models 1 (Table 2), the effects of sexual orientation are positive and statistically 
significant for both warmth toward lesbians and gays and perceived amount of homophobic 
discrimination. LGB respondents report significantly more warmth toward (=30.93; p<.001) 
and perceive greater discrimination against (OR [odds ratios]: 3.16; CI [confidence intervals]: 
2.30-4.32) lesbian women and gay men than do heterosexuals. Net of sociodemographic controls 
in Models 2, the effects of sexual orientation are again significant on these two altitudinal items. 
In the final model – Model 3 – LGB respondents are once again report being significantly more 
warm toward (=30.93; p<.001) and perceive more discrimination against (OR: 2.13; CI: 1.53-
2.93) lesbians and gays than heterosexuals, net of gender, race and ethnicity, household income, 
age, marital/partner status, region, education, religious attendance, and political ideology. 
The estimates for sexual orientation differences in favoring legal recognition of same-sex 
couples and favoring allowing same-sex couples to adopt children (Table 3) mirror those of the 
first two attitudes toward sexuality. Across all three models, LGB respondents are significantly 
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more likely than heterosexuals to favor recognition of same-sex couples (OR: 3.98; CI: 2.29-6.93 
[Model 3]) and allowing such couples to adopt children (OR: 6.89; CI: 3.43-13.87).  
Taken together, there are significant sexual orientation gaps in all four of the 
aforementioned sexuality attitudes, even net of sociodemographic controls, including education, 
religious attendance, and political ideology. Compared to heterosexuals, LGB respondents hold 
significantly more liberal attitudes toward themselves. Thus, at least with regard to views on 
LGB people, relationships, and rights, sexual orientation has a significant effect on respondents’ 
attitudes. The following analyses will assess whether the significant effect of sexual orientation 
on attitudes extends beyond LGB respondents’ self-interest. 
 [INSERT TABLE 3 HERE] 
5.3 Race Attitudes 
 Next, I examine whether LGB and heterosexual ANES respondents differ significantly in 
their race attitudes. Table 4 displays the regression estimates for the effects of sexual orientation 
on eleven race attitudinal items, which reflect the following domains: support for Affirmative 
Action programs and policies, perceptions of racist discrimination and inequality, and feelings 
toward Black Americans. Models 1 regress each racial attitudinal outcome on sexual orientation, 
controlling for survey version. Models 2 add controls for gender, race and ethnicity, gender, 
household income, age, marital/partner status, and region of the country. Finally, Models 3 add 
additional controls for education, religious attendance, and political ideology. 
 [INSERT TABLE 4 HERE] 
 In Models 1, the effect of sexual orientation is positive and significant for one of the two 
items regarding support for Affirmative Action. LGB respondents are significantly more likely to 
favor Affirmative Action for Black Americans in higher education (OR: 1.62; CI: 1.11-2.35) 
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compared to heterosexuals. The effect of sexual orientation on this attitudinal outcome is also 
significant in Model 2 (OR: 1.50; CI: 1.00-2.25). That is, LGB people hold more liberal views on 
this outcome than heterosexuals, net of other sociodemographic controls. Upon controlling for 
education, religious attendance, and political ideology in Model 3, there is no longer a significant 
difference in LGB and heterosexual respondents’ views on this outcome. However, across all 
three models, there is no significant difference between LGB people and heterosexual people on 
favoring Affirmative Action for Black people in hiring (OR: .87; CI: .56-1.34 [Model 3]). 
 The effects of sexual orientation on perceptions of racist discrimination and inequality are 
positive and significant for all three items in this domain in Models 1 and 2. Net of 
sociodemographic controls (Models 2), LGB respondents perceive significantly greater racist 
discrimination (OR: 2.29; CI: 1.54-3.38), and too much influence of white Americans (OR: 2.75; 
CI: 1.76-4.29) and too little influence of Black Americans (OR: 2.00; CI: 1.29-3.12) in US 
politics. In Models 3, which control for education, religious attendance, and political ideology, 
the effect of sexual orientation remains significant for only one of these items – perceived 
amount of discrimination against Black people (OR: 1.57; CI: 1.05-2.35) – wherein LGB people 
perceive a significantly greater amount of racist discrimination than do heterosexual people  
 There are significant sexual orientation gaps for half of the six items regarding 
respondents’ feelings toward Black people: sympathy and admiration for Black Americans, and 
racial resentment. LGB people report significantly greater sympathy for Black people (OR: 1.77; 
CI: 1.23-2.55) and less racial resentment (=1.78; p<.001) than do heterosexuals, net of 
sociodemographic controls; however, the effects of sexual orientation on these feelings are 
nonsignificant in Models 3, which control for the three potential mechanisms. Across all three 
models, the effect of sexual orientation is positive and significant for admiration for Black 
SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND ATTITUDES    24 
Americans. Net of sociodemographic controls, as well as education, religious attendance, and 
political ideology, LGB respondents report feeling significantly more admiration toward Black 
people (OR: 1.50; CI: 1.04-2.17). The effects of sexual orientation on the remaining three items 
– view of Black Americans as hardworking and as intelligent, and warmth toward Black 
Americans – are nonsignificant in all three models. 
 Taken together, LGB respondents hold more liberal race attitudes than heterosexuals, net 
of other important sociodemographic characteristics (Models 2) for nearly two-thirds of the 
outcomes (7 of 11, or 64 percent). In particular, compared to heterosexuals, LGB people are 
significantly more likely to favor Affirmative Action in higher education for Black Americans, 
perceive a great deal of racist discrimination and inequality (in politics), feel sympathy and 
admiration for Black people, and hold relatively low racial resentment. However, upon 
controlling for the potential mechanisms – education, religious attendance, and political ideology 
– the effects of sexual orientation remain significant on only two of the race attitudes (2 out of 
11, or 18 percent): perceived amount of discrimination against and admiration for Black people. 
5.4 Gender Attitudes 
 In the third set of analyses, I examine whether LGB and heterosexual ANES respondents 
differ significantly in their gender attitudes, which include the domains of traditional gender 
roles, recognition of sexist discrimination, and support for legalized abortion. Table 5 provides 
the regression estimates for the effects of sexual orientation on the twelve gender attitudinal 
items. Models 1 regress each gender attitudinal item on sexual orientation, controlling for survey 
version. Models 2 add controls for respondents’ race and ethnicity, gender, education, income, 
age, region, and religious attendance. Finally, in Models 3, I add controls for political ideology. 
[INSERT TABLE 5 HERE] 
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 Across all three models, the effects of sexual orientation are positive and significant for 
two of the three items regarding gender roles. LGB respondents are significantly more likely 
than heterosexuals to see having a woman president in the next 20 years as beneficial for the US 
(OR: 1.61; CI: 1.07-2.40 [Model 3]) and that it is worse for families to have women work in the 
home while their husbands work outside of it (OR: 1.59; CI: 1.14-2.21 [Model 3]). In addition, in 
Model 1, LGB people are significantly more likely than heterosexuals to agree that it is easier for 
a working mother to establish warm and secure relationships with her children than mothers who 
do not work outside of the home (OR: 1.46; CI: 1.01-2.11); however, the effect of sexual 
orientation on this outcome is nonsignificant in Models 2 and 3. 
 The effects of sexual orientation are positive and significant on four of the seven items 
regarding recognition of sexist discrimination in Models 1, and in Models 2 net of 
sociodemographic controls. LGB respondents perceive significantly more sexist discrimination 
in the US (OR: 2.86; CI: 1.92-4.26 [Model 2]), and are significantly more likely to report that 
sexism is a serious problem in the US (OR: 2.00; CI: 1.26-3.15 [Model 2]), than do 
heterosexuals. Additionally, LGB respondents are significantly more likely than heterosexuals to 
report that men have more opportunities than women (OR: 1.81; CI: 1.24-2.63) and that that the 
media should pay more attention to sexist discrimination (OR: 2.15; CI: 1.45-3.17 [Model 2]). 
However, LGB people do not differ significantly from heterosexuals in the extent to which they 
perceive that employers discriminate against women in the workplace. In addition, the effects for 
sexual orientation on two items that reflect modern sexism – that is, the belief that women are 
demanding special favors rather than equal treatment, and that they cause more problems by 
complaining about discrimination – are nonsignificant. Taken together, LGB people report 
significantly more liberal views, net of other important sociodemographic characteristics, on 
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over half of the items regarding sexist discrimination. The effect of sexual orientation is 
significant net of education, religious attendance, and political ideology (Models 3) for only one 
item: perceived amount of discrimination (OR: 2.14; CI: 1.44-3.16). 
 Finally, the effects of sexual orientation are positive and significant on both abortion 
attitudes in Models 1 and 2. Even net of sociodemographic characteristics, LGB respondents are 
significantly more likely to favor legal access to abortion services than are heterosexual 
respondents. However, upon controlling for education, religious attendance, and political 
ideology in Models 3, the effect of sexual orientation on abortion attitudes is nonsignificant. 
 In sum, there are significant sexual orientation gaps in gender attitudes, net of other 
important sociodemographic predictors (Models 2), for two-thirds of the outcomes (8 out of 12, 
or 67 percent). Compared to heterosexuals, LGB respondents hold more liberal attitudes 
regarding gender roles, are more likely to recognize pervasive sexist discrimination as a problem, 
and are more likely to oppose restrictions on access to abortion services. For these outcomes, the 
effects of sexual orientation remain significant even upon accounting for the influence of other 
powerful determinants of gender attitudes. However, the effects of sexual orientation remain 
significant net of education, religious attendance, and political ideology (Models 3) for only one-
quarter of gender attitudinal outcomes (3 out of 12, or 25 percent): seeing a woman president as 
beneficial to the US; believing that women as homemakers is worse for families; and, perceiving 
a great amount of sexist discrimination in the US. 
5.5 Explaining Sexual Orientation Gaps in Attitudes 
In Models 2 of the aforementioned multivariate analyses, there were significant sexual 
orientation gaps in all four sexuality attitudes, as well as for a majority of the attitudes regarding 
race (7 out of 11) and gender (8 out of 12), net of gender, race and ethnicity, household income, 
SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND ATTITUDES    27 
age, marital/partner status, and region of the country. Upon controlling for education, religious 
attendance, and political ideology in Models 3, it appears that almost all of these gaps were 
reduced, at least slightly. Indeed, the difference between LGB and heterosexual respondents’ 
attitudes was nonsignificant for five race attitudes and five gender attitudes, net of these potential 
mechanisms. It is possible that sexual orientation differences in education, religious attendance, 
and/or political ideology (Models 3) explain LGB respondents’ relatively more liberal sexuality, 
race, and gender attitudes. 
In the final set of analyses, I use post-hoc Sobel tests for mediation, including 
sociodemographic controls, to investigate the extent to which education, religious attendance, 
and political ideology mediate the effects of sexual orientation on attitudes. These attitudes 
include the four sexuality attitudes, seven race attitudes, and eight gender attitudes for which 
there were significant sexual orientation gaps in Models 2 (Tables 2-5). Table 6 presents the 
estimates for mediation analysis for the potential mechanisms; these estimates include the level 
at which the mediation is statistically significant, the Sobel test statistic (Z), and the percentage 
of the total effect of sexual orientation on each attitude that is explained by the mechanism. 
Whereas preliminary results (available upon request) suggest that education does not 
significantly mediate the effect of sexual orientation on any attitude, these estimates are not 
included in Table 6. 
[INSERT TABLE 6 HERE] 
The effects of sexual orientation on seven of these nineteen items (37 percent) are 
significantly mediated by religious attendance. Sexual orientation differences in religious 
attendance explain 3-5 percent of the significant sexual orientation differences for three sexuality 
items: warmth toward lesbians and gays (Z=2.24; p<.05); favoring legal recognition of same-sex 
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couples (Z=2.26; p<.05); and, favoring legalizing adoption for same-sex couples (Z=3.75; 
p<.05). Interestingly, for two racial attitudinal items – sympathy (Z=-2.14; p<.05) and admiration 
(Z=-2.16; p<.05) toward Black Americans – religious attendance widens the gap between LGB 
and heterosexual respondents’ feelings. That is, religious attendance appears to suppress the 
effects of sexual orientation on these two items. Finally, religious attendance explains roughly 6 
percent of LGB respondents’ more liberal views regarding the benefits of a woman president 
(Z=1.99; p<.05) and the harm of having women as homemakers for their families (Z=2.17; 
p<.05). Taken together, the mediating role of religious attendance of the sexual orientation-
attitudes link is selective and generally small. 
Interestingly, the effects of sexual orientation on attitudes are significantly mediated by 
political ideology for all nineteen sexuality, race, and gender attitudes. Liberal political ideology 
explains between 14.09 (favor legal adoption for same-sex couples; Z=8.422; p<.001) and 32.00 
(perceive great amount of homophobic discrimination; Z=8.25; p<.001) percent of the significant 
sexual orientation gap in sexuality attitudes. The mediating role of political ideology on the 
sexual orientation-attitudes is markedly stronger for race and gender attitudes, explaining, on 
average, roughly 55 percent of the total effects of sexual orientation on these attitudes. For race 
attitudes, this explanatory power of political ideology ranges from 22.60 percent (i.e., admiration 
for Black people [Z=5.79; p<.001]) to 94.70 percent (i.e., favoring Affirmative Action for Black 
people in higher education [Z=8.82; p<.001]). Its explanatory ranges from 25.69 percent (i.e., 
perceived amount of sexist discrimination [Z=7.87; p<.001]) to 116.98 percent (i.e., legalized 
abortion scale [Z=9.12; p<.001]). For the latter item – views regarding legal access to abortion 
services – the effect of sexual orientation becomes nonsignificant and reverses in direction (i.e., 
negative) upon the inclusion of a control for political ideology. Thus, it appears that LGB 
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respondents’ relatively more liberal political ideology explains a substantial amount of their 
more liberal attitudes toward Black Americans and women. In many cases, it explains half of to 
nearly the full total effect of sexual orientation on race and gender attitudes. 
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6. DISCUSSION 
In the present paper, I sought to extend preliminary research on the effect of sexual orientation 
on sexuality, race, and gender attitudes using a nationally representative sample of lesbian, gay, 
bisexual (LGB) and heterosexual Americans. In particular, I examined whether LGB people, 
given their marginalized status, hold more liberal attitudes toward women and Black Americans, 
as well as themselves, than do their heterosexual counterparts. I also assessed the extent to which 
sexual orientation gaps in attitudes are explained by sexual orientation differences in three 
mechanisms that shape attitudes: education, religion, and political ideology. Building upon prior 
attitudinal research, I identified four possibilities for the relationship between sexual orientation 
and attitudes: 1) no sexual orientation differences, especially upon accounting for the influence 
of other sociodemographic characteristics; 2) LGB people’s more liberal attitudes toward 
themselves, perhaps due to self-interest; 3) LGB people’s more liberal sexuality, race, and 
gender attitudes, perhaps due to their “underdog” status in society; and, finally, 4) LGB people’s 
more liberal sexuality, race, and gender attitudes, partially driven by their relatively high level of 
education and political liberalism, yet low religiosity. 
 The results offer two key findings. First, there is clear evidence that sexual orientation 
has a strong effect on Americans’ sexuality, race, and gender attitudes, wherein LGB people tend 
to hold more liberal views regarding lesbian and gay rights, racial and gender equality. 
Compared to their heterosexual peers, LGB people are more likely to favor legal same-sex 
marriage, adoption by same-sex couples, and feel warmer toward and recognize greater 
discrimination against lesbian women and gay men. Similar patterns were found for the majority 
of attitudes regarding race (7 out of 11 items [64 percent]) and gender (8 out of 12 items [67 
percent]), net of the influence of other powerful sociodemographic predictors of these attitudes. 
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These results suggest that there are substantial sexual orientation gaps in a number of domains, 
wherein LGB people are more liberal in their views than are heterosexuals: recognition of racist 
and sexist discrimination; recognition of racial and gender inequality; racial resentment; 
sympathy and admiration toward Blacks; rejection of traditional gender roles; and, favoring 
unrestricted and legal access to abortion services. Initially, these findings offer support for 
Hypothesis 3, wherein LGB people hold more liberal sexuality, race, and gender attitudes even 
once accounting for the effects of other sociodemographic characteristics. 
 Second, the majority of the aforementioned nineteen significant sexual orientation gaps in 
sexuality, race, and gender attitudes were explained, at least partially, by LGB’s relatively more 
liberal political ideology. Upon controlling for education, religious attendance, and political 
ideology, the effects of sexual orientation became nonsignificant for ten of these nineteen 
attitudinal outcomes (e.g., racial inequality in politics, racial resentment, abortion, level of sexist 
discrimination); the effects of sexual orientation on many of the other nine attitudinal items are 
reduced (e.g., all four sexuality attitudes, racist discrimination, rejection of traditional gender 
roles). Sexual orientation differences in political ideology explained nearly one-fourth, on 
average, of LGB people’s more liberal sexuality attitudes. Notably, LGB people’s greater 
political liberalism explained, on average, over half of the significant sexual orientation 
differences in race and gender attitudes. These patterns offer partial support for Hypothesis 4, 
wherein sexual orientation gaps in sexuality, race, and gender attitudes are partially driven by 
sexual orientation differences in political ideology, and slightly by religious attendance (but not 
education). These findings complement prior work on LGB Americans’ distinctive politically 
liberal profile, highlighting that their liberal views also extend to racial and gender issues (Beran 
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et al. 1992; Corbett et al. 1977; Hertzog 1996; Lalonde et al. 2000; McDonald and Moore 1978; 
Schaffner and Senic 2006). 
 On the whole, the results offer greatest support for the prediction that sexual orientation 
gaps exist in sexuality, race, and gender attitudes that are driven, in large part, by political 
ideology. However, to varying degrees, the present paper’s findings can be interpreted to lend 
support for the role of socialization, and self-interest and empathy (both via the underdog thesis). 
The role of heteronormative socialization in shaping heterosexuals’ and sexual minorities’ 
attitudes alike cannot be overlooked. For example, a small minority (6-7 percent) of LGB people 
reported unfavorable or conservative attitudes toward themselves: cold feelings toward gays and 
lesbians; perception of little or no homophobic discrimination; and opposition to same-sex 
marriage and adoption. LGB adults are perhaps not entirely immune from the prejudiced values 
and attitudes of their families, peers, and the influence of other social institutions. Yet, the 
overwhelming rejection of homophobic attitudes by LGB respondents may reflect an active 
rejection of their parents’ values, particularly those that clash with their own identities and 
experiences (Ojeda and Hatemi 2015). 
 There is greater evidence, however, of an alternative view of the role of socialization in 
producing sexual orientation differences in attitudes. The results of the present study parallel 
Egan’s (2012) finding that nearly half of the difference in political attitudes and behaviors 
between LGB and heterosexual people is attributable to differences in upbringing, wherein LGB 
people are more likely to be raised in liberal homes and communities (Felson 2011; also see 
Butler 2005 and McCabe, Brewster, and Tillman 2011). In particular, certain characteristics of 
respondents’ upbringing explained LGB people’s relatively more liberal political ideology: 
college-educated mothers, younger age, urban hometown, raised in a region of the country with 
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greater acceptance of homosexuality, and being raised by both parents who were born in the US. 
In other words, similar to one variant of exposure as a mechanism through which gender 
attitudes are shaped (Bolzendahl and Myers 2004; Davis and Greenstein 2009), LGB people are 
more likely to be exposed to liberal values during childhood and adolescence. Indeed, Egan 
(2012) argues that LGB Americans are politically cohesive as a group even before or in the 
absence of group mobilization and contact with fellow LGBTQ people in general; their 
distinctiveness has already emerged by the start of adulthood.  
The present paper cannot adequately investigate the potentially complex interplay 
between sexual identity and sociopolitical attitudes during childhood socialization given its 
reliance on cross-sectional data. For example, socialization within a liberal household may 
influence children to be more open regarding diverse sexual identities (including exploring their 
own) (Stacey and Biblarz 2001); yet, prior research suggests that the effect of socialization on 
attitudes (especially on gender roles) gives way to the influences of experiences and relationships 
in adulthood (Davis and Greenstein 2009). Socialization alone, then, may not explain sexual 
orientation differences in attitudes. Future research should investigate other potential 
mechanisms (e.g., discrimination, marriage, the extent to which one is “out” or public about their 
LGB identity) that may strengthen or weaken the effects of sexual orientation on social and 
political attitudes, with particular attention their influence over the life course.  
The results also suggest that the underdog thesis (Davis and Robison 1991; Robinson 
1983; Robinson and Bell 1978) may be applicable for explaining LGB people’s relatively liberal 
sexuality, race, and gender attitudes. LGB Americans, as an “underdog” group – a population 
subjected to widespread discrimination and violence – are more aware of sexual, racial, and 
gender inequality, especially discrimination, and are more likely to favor programs and policies 
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that redress such inequality. It is noteworthy that LGB people’s underdog status influences their 
views about their own equal treatment, but also the equal treatment of Black Americans and 
women. Yet, compared to attitudes toward themselves, LGB people’s liberal race and gender 
attitudes were explained to a much greater extent by their more liberal political ideology. This 
slight distinction may be driven, in part, by the greater strength of LGB people’s motivation to 
advance their own rights and status in society (i.e., self-interest) than that of their liberal political 
ideology and, presumably, their liberal upbringing (Lewis et al. 2011; Schaffner and Senic 
2006).  
 A few limitations of this study should be noted. First, the analyses rely on cross-sectional 
data, which prohibit the investigation of the relationships among sexual orientation and attitudes 
over time. Additionally, the ANES does not include measures that reflect respondents’ 
upbringing nor experiences of discrimination and violence. Future research using longitudinal 
design should further examine the relationships and temporal ordering among upbringing, sexual 
identity, experiences of stigma and discrimination (as “underdogs”), and social attitudes.  
Second, the ANES data include a small subsample size of lesbian, gay, and bisexual 
individuals (n=203). As such, the results may present a conservative estimate of the extent and 
strength of sexual orientation gaps in sexuality, race, and gender attitudes. The small subsample 
size prevented meaningful comparisons between bisexual respondents and lesbian and gay 
respondents. Supplemental analyses comparing the three groups – bisexuals, lesbians and gays, 
and heterosexuals – suggested that the two former groups differ significantly on eleven outcomes 
(see Footnote #5). In particular, lesbians and gays are perhaps more liberal in their sexuality, 
race, and gender than are bisexuals. Indeed, there may be important demographic, ideological, 
and experiential differences among bisexuals, lesbians, and gays (e.g., socioeconomic status, age 
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at coming out, LGBTQ community involvement, experiences of discrimination, voting 
behaviors; Pew Research Center 2013). However, given the extremely small subsample sizes of 
sexual orientation groups, these results should be interpreted with caution. In addition, the small 
number of LGB identified ANES respondents also prohibited an investigation of intersections 
among sexual orientation and other important identities like race, gender, and social class. 
Perhaps similar to research on (the absence of) gender differences in whites’ race attitudes 
(Hughes and Tuch 2003), researchers may also find that whites’ race attitudes do not vary by 
sexual orientation due to a shared racial group position. Obtaining large and representative 
samples of LGB people, as a hard-to-reach population, remains a challenge for survey research 
(Binson et al. 2010; Meyer and Wilson 2009). 
 A final limitation is the use of self-reported sexual identity as a measure of sexual 
orientation. This measure is limited in a few ways. First, nearly three percent of ANES 
respondents did not disclose their sexual orientation. Certain populations – for example, those 
with lower levels of education – are more likely to refuse such information (Jans et al. 2015). 
Given the stigma that surrounds same-sex sexuality, an unknowable number of sexual minorities 
may have refused to identify as LGB during the ANES interview or online survey; however, 
greater social acceptance of LGBTQ people has coincided with less non-response on questions 
pertaining to sexual identity and increased LGB identification (Jans et al. 2015). Second, the 
ANES sexual orientation item was limited to heterosexual, lesbian, gay, and bisexual identities, 
thus overlooking other identities (e.g., queer, pansexual). Some research suggests that less visible 
and uncommon identities may be associated with more radical views (Harr and Kane 2008; 
Rollins and Hirsh 2003, 2007). Finally, other dimensions of sexuality – namely attraction and 
behavior (Sell 2010) – were not considered in the analyses. Though overlapping, same-sex 
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attraction, same-sex sexual behavior, and LGB identity do not perfectly correlate in the 
population; the majority of adults who report any same-sex sexual partners identify as 
heterosexuals (Gates 2011; Herbenick et al. 2010). It is unclear, for example, whether the 
attitudes of heterosexual identified people who are attracted to or have had relationships with 
people of their own gender would mirror those of other heterosexuals, those of LGB identified 
people, or be distinct from both. Future research on attitudes should offer a more inclusive set of 
sexual identities and include measures of multiple dimensions of sexuality. 
 The aforementioned limitations considered, the present paper offers the first estimates of 
the effects of sexual orientation on sexuality, race, and gender attitudes within a nationally 
representative sample of American adults. It contributes to research on the predictors of 
Americans’ sexuality, race, and gender attitudes, in particular, lending strong support for adding 
sexual orientation to the list of sociodemographic predictors of attitudes. This study also 
contributes to the growing body of research on the social, political, and demographic profile of 
LGBTQ Americans. Along with other studies, it highlights the social and political distinctiveness 
of this marginalized population. Future research should continue to examine the role that 
sexuality plays in one’s sexual and non-sexual lives, including one’s attitudes and worldviews.
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TABLE 1. Descriptive Statistics for Sociodemographic Characteristics by Sexual Orientation (N=4,526) 
 
SAMPLE  
(N=4,526) 
Heterosexuals 
Respondents  
(n=4,323) 
Lesbian, Gay, and Bisexual Respondents 
All LGB 
(n=203) 
Bisexual 
(n=93) 
Lesbian/Gay 
(n=110) 
Lesbian, gay, or bisexual (1=yes) .04 -- -- -- -- 
Female (1=yes) .51 .51 .43 .57 .31***A 
Black (1=yes) .11 .11 .12 .14 .10 
Latina/o (1=yes) .11 .11 .14 .10 .17 
Other nonwhite (1=yes) .06 .06 .07 .09 .05 
Household income (logged; 10.60=$42,500) 10.61 10.62 10.37* 10.28** 10.45 
Age, in years (18-90+) 47.40 47.68 40.96*** 40.06*** 41.72*A 
Married/Partnered (1=yes) .63 .64 .44*** .40*** .46*** 
US South (1=yes) .37 .38 .32 .38 .28 
Education (0=less than high school; 4=graduate degree) 1.94 1.94 1.99 1.69 2.24***A 
Religious attendance (0=never; 5=more than once per week) 1.59 1.62 .84*** 1.04** .67*** 
Political ideology (0=extremely conservative; 6=extremely liberal) 2.77 2.71 4.04*** 3.50*** 4.50***A 
Source: 2012 American National Election Survey.  
Notes: * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 compared to heterosexuals. 
Sample sizes based on unweighted data. 
A Lesbian and gay respondents significantly differ from bisexual respondents (p<.05). 
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TABLE 2. OLS Regression Estimates and Odds Ratios for the Effects of Sexual 
Orientation on Sexuality Attitudes (N=4,526) 
 Warmth toward Gays and Lesbiansa  Amount of Homophobic Discriminationb 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Lesbian, Gay, 30.93*** 30.15*** 22.16***  3.16*** 3.17*** 2.13*** 
or Bisexual (2.32) (2.36) (2.15)  (2.30-4.32) (2.31-4.36) (1.54-2.93) 
        
Female  9.23*** 9.32***   1.40*** 1.35*** 
  (1.08) (1.01)   (1.22-1.61) (1.17-1.56) 
        
Black  3.55* 2.91   2.04*** 1.72*** 
  (1.79) (1.82)   (1.58-2.63) (1.32-2.26) 
        
Latina/o  3.77 4.54*   1.19 1.06 
  (1.96) (1.80)   (.92-1.53) (.81-1.37) 
        
Other  -5.07* -6.11*   .93 .89 
Nonwhite  (2.56) (2.45)   (.67-1.29) (.64-1.23) 
        
Income  2.44*** 1.46**   1.00 1.03 
  (.53) (.54)   (.94-1.07) (.96-1.11) 
        
Age  -.18*** -.09**   1.00 1.00 
  (.03) (.03)   (1.00-1.00) (1.00-1.01) 
        
Married/  -2.43* -.87   .85* .90 
Partnered  (1.21) (1.13)   (.72-.99) (.76-1.05) 
        
US South  -5.17*** -3.37**   .95 1.02 
  (1.16) (1.08)   (.82-1.10) (.87-1.18) 
        
Education   3.14***    .92* 
   (.46)    (.86-.98) 
        
Religious   -2.82***    .97 
Attendance   (.32)    (.93-1.01) 
        
Liberal   4.81***    1.41*** 
   (.36)    (1.34-1.49) 
Source: 2012 American National Election Survey.  
Notes: All models control for survey version. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.  
a Ordinary least squares (OLS) regression estimates, with standard errors in parentheses.  
b Ordered logistic odds ratios, with 95 percent confidence intervals in parentheses. 
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TABLE 3. Odds Ratios for the Effects of Sexual Orientation on Attitudes Regarding Same-
Sex Couples and Adoption (N=4,526) 
 Legal Recognition of Same-Sex Couplesa  Allow Same-Sex Couples to Adoptb 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Lesbian, Gay, 7.17*** 6.70*** 3.98***  10.41*** 10.52*** 6.89*** 
or Bisexual (4.44-11.58) (4.13-1.87) (2.29-6.93)  (4.89-22.16) (4.88-22.66) (3.43-13.87) 
        
Female  1.30*** 1.39***   1.51*** 1.71*** 
  (1.12-1.51) (1.19-1.64)   (1.28-1.79) (1.42-2.07) 
        
Black  .75* .65**   .94 .91 
  (.59-.95) (.50-.85)   (.72-1.23) (.67-1.24) 
        
Latina/o  .97 .95   .65** .62** 
  (.75-1.26) (.72-1.26)   (.49-.85) (.46-.85) 
        
Other  .67* .56**   .67* .52** 
Nonwhite  (.49-.93) (.38-.81)   (.47-.95) (.35-.79) 
        
Income  1.11** 1.06   1.11** 1.07 
  (1.03-1.19) (.98-1.16)   (1.03-1.20) (.98-1.17) 
        
Age  .98*** .99***   .98*** .99** 
  (.98-.99) (.99-1.00)   (.98-.99) (.98-1.00) 
        
Married/  .77** .87   .89 1.03 
Partnered  (.66-.91) (.73-1.04)   (.74-1.07) (.84-1.26) 
        
US South  .67*** .74***   .70*** .78* 
  (.58-.79) (.63-.88)   (.59-.84) (.65-.95) 
        
Education   1.30***    1.29*** 
   (1.20-1.41)    (1.17-1.41) 
        
Religious   .69***    .69*** 
Attendance   (.66-.73)    (.65-.73) 
        
Liberal   1.71***    1.60*** 
   (1.60-1.81)    (1.48-1.72) 
Source: 2012 American National Election Survey.  
Notes: All models control for survey version. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.  
a Ordered logistic odds ratios, with 95 percent confidence intervals in parentheses. 
b Binary logistic odds ratios, with 95 percent confidence intervals in parentheses. 
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 TABLE 4. Ordered Logistic Odds Ratios and OLS Regression Estimates for the Effects of 
Sexual Orientation on Race Attitudes (N=4,526) 
  
Model 1  Model 2  Model 3 
OR (95% CI)  OR (95% CI)  OR (95% CI) 
Affirmative Action         
Affirmative Action for 
Blacks in higher education 
1.62* (1.11-2.35) 
 
1.50* (1.00-2.25) 
 
1.02 (.66-1.58) 
         
Affirmative Action for 
Blacks in hiring 
1.43 (.98-2.07) 
 
1.31 (.89-1.93) 
 
.87 (.56-1.34) 
         
Discrimination and Inequality         
Great deal of discrimination 
against Blacks in US today 
2.26*** (1.55-3.29) 
 
2.29*** (1.54-3.38) 
 
1.57* (1.05-2.35) 
         
Whites have too much 
influence in US politics 
2.66*** (1.81-3.92) 
 
2.75*** (1.76-4.29) 
 
1.54 (.99-2.40) 
         
Blacks have too little 
influence in US politics 
2.11*** (1.45-3.06) 
 
2.00** (1.29-3.12) 
 
1.27 (.79-2.03) 
         
Feelings toward Black People         
Sympathy toward Blacks 1.68** (1.20-2.37)  1.77** (1.23-2.55)  1.44 (1.00-2.07) 
         
Admiration toward Blacks 1.49* (1.08-2.07)  1.60* (1.12-2.30)  1.50* (1.04-2.17) 
         
Blacks are hardworking 1.29 (.98-1.71)  1.30 (.96-1.77)  1.09 (.79-1.50) 
         
Blacks are intelligent .98 (.73-1.31)  1.00 (.73-1.37)  .94 (.68-1.29) 
         
Warmth toward Blacksa .64 (2.18)  1.70 (2.33)  .55 (2.33) 
         
Racial resentment scalea 1.93*** (.39)  1.78*** (.39)  .65 (.39) 
Source: 2012 American National Election Survey. Notes: * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 (two-tailed tests). Higher 
odds and estimates represent more liberal attitudes for each racial attitude outcome.  
Models 1 control for sexual orientation and survey version.  
Models 2 add controls for race and ethnicity, gender, income, age, marital/partner status, and region.  
Models 3 add controls for education, religious attendance, and political ideology. 
a OLS regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses.  
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TABLE 5. Ordered Logistic Odds Ratios and OLS Regression Estimates for the Effects of 
Sexual Orientation on Gender Attitudes (N=4,526) 
  
Model 1  Model 2  Model 3 
OR (95% CI)  OR (95% CI)  OR (95% CI) 
Gender Roles         
Good for the US to have a 
woman president in next 20 
years 
2.48*** 
(1.71-
3.60) 
 
2.51*** (1.68-3.77) 
 
1.61* 
(1.07-
2.40) 
         
Working mothers can 
establish warm and secure 
relationships with children 
1.46* 
(1.01-
2.11) 
 
1.45 (1.00-2.12) 
 
1.23 (.84-1.81) 
         
Worse for family if man 
works and woman is a 
homemaker 
2.60*** 
(1.87-
3.60) 
 
2.27*** (1.63-3.16) 
 
1.59** 
(1.14-
2.21) 
         
Sexist Discrimination         
Great deal of sexist 
discrimination in US today 
2.66*** 
(1.80-
3.93) 
 
2.86*** (1.92-4.26) 
 
2.14*** 
(1.44-
3.16) 
         
Sexist discrimination in the 
US is a serious problem 
2.01** 
(1.30-
3.11) 
 
2.00** (1.26-3.15) 
 
1.38 (.88-2.15) 
         
Employers often discriminate 
against women in the 
workplace 
1.37 (.91-2.06) 
 
1.36 (.89-2.08) 
 
1.14 (.74-1.76) 
         
Men have many more 
opportunities for achievement 
than women 
1.63** 
(1.14-
2.35) 
 
1.81** (1.24-2.63) 
 
1.26 (.89-1.79) 
         
Media should pay more 
attention to sexist 
discrimination 
2.03*** 
(1.42-
2.90) 
 
2.15*** (1.45-3.17) 
 
1.42 (.96-2.09) 
         
Women demand equality, not 
special favors. 
1.36 (.88-2.11) 
 
1.45 (.95-2.20) 
 
.93 (.61-1.43) 
         
Women do not cause 
problems by complaining 
about discrimination 
1.44 (.89-2.33) 
 
1.44 (.88-2.34) 
 
1.03 (.63-1.66) 
         
Abortion         
No restrictions on abortion 
2.21*** 
(1.56-
3.14) 
 
2.24*** (1.56-3.22) 
 
1.19 (.81-1.76) 
         
Legalized abortion scalea  6.29*** (1.51)  6.29*** (1.48)  -.59 (1.16) 
         
Source: 2012 American National Election Survey. Notes: * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 (two-tailed tests). Higher 
odds and estimates represent more liberal attitudes for each gender attitude outcome.  
Models 1 control for sexual orientation and survey version.  
Models 2 add controls for race and ethnicity, gender, income, age, marital/partner status, and region. 
Models 3 add controls for education, religious attendance, and political ideology. 
a OLS regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses.  
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TABLE 6. Summary of Mediation Analyses for Religious Attendance and Political 
Ideology on the Sexual Orientation-Attitudes Relationships 
 Religious Attendance  Political Ideology 
 
Sig. Z % explained  Sig. Z 
% 
explained 
Sexuality Attitudes        
Warmth toward gays and lesbians * 2.239 3.457  *** 8.660 19.189 
        
Amount of homophobic discrimination  ns - -  *** 8.245 32.001 
        
Favor legal recognition of same-sex couples * 2.261 4.693  *** 8.888 23.344 
        
Belief that same-sex couples should be 
legally permitted to adopt children 
* 2.257 3.745 
 *** 8.422 14.093 
        
Race Attitudes        
Affirmative Action for Blacks in higher 
education 
ns 
- -  *** 8.823 94.695 
        
Great deal of racist discrimination in US 
today 
ns 
- -  *** 8.193 43.563 
        
Whites have too much influence in politics ns - -  *** 8.491 54.767 
        
Blacks have too little influence in politics ns - -  *** 8.402 63.843 
        
Sympathy toward Blacks * -2.143 -1.430  *** 7.511 41.262 
        
Admiration toward Blacks * -2.156 -10.990  *** 5.788 22.596 
        
Racial resentment scalea ns - -  *** 9.044 60.999 
        
Gender Attitudes        
Good for the US to have a woman president 
in next 20 years 
* 
1.985 5.723  *** 
8.403 42.155 
        
Worse for family if man works and woman 
is a homemaker 
* 
2.166 5.988  *** 
7.124 35.393 
        
Great deal of sexist discrimination today ns - -  *** 7.867 25.691 
        
Sexist discrimination in the US is a serious 
problem 
ns 
- -  *** 
8.296 50.424 
        
Men have many more opportunities for 
achievement than women 
ns 
- -  *** 
7.540 54.759 
        
Media should pay more attention to sexist 
discrimination 
ns 
- -  *** 
8.467 49.920 
        
No restrictions on abortion ns - -  *** 8.637 68.069 
        
Legalized abortion scalea  ns - -  *** 9.122 116.980 
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Source: 2012 American National Election Survey. Notes: * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. Controls include survey 
version, race, ethnicity, gender, income, age, marital/partner status, region, and education. Percentages represent 
how much of the effect of sexual orientation on the attitudinal outcome is explained.
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APPENDIX A. Descriptive Statistics for Sociodemographic Characteristics by Survey 
Version (N=4,823) 
 
SAMPLE  
(N=4,526) 
Face-to-Face 
Version  
(n=1,174) 
Internet 
Version 
(n=3,352) 
Lesbian, gay, or bisexual (1=yes) .04 .03 .04 
Female (1=yes) .51 .52 .50 
Black (1=yes) .11 .10 .12 
Latina/o (1=yes) .11 .10 .11 
Other nonwhite (1=yes) .06 .06 .06 
Household income (logged; 10.60=$42,500) 10.61 10.71 10.58** 
Age, in years (18-90+) 47.40 46.52 47.73* 
Married/Partnered (1=yes) .63 .65 .62 
US South (1=yes) .37 .37 .38 
Education (0=less than high school; 4=graduate degree) 1.94 2.01 1.91 
Religious attendance (0=never; 5=more than once per week) 1.59 1.69 1.55* 
Political ideology (0=extremely conservative; 6=extremely 
liberal) 
2.77 2.81 2.75 
Source: 2012 American National Election Survey.  
Notes: * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 compared to respondents who completed the face-to-face version of the 
survey. Sample sizes based on unweighted data. 
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APPENDIX B. Means, Standard Deviations, Metrics, and Descriptions of American 
National Election Survey (ANES) Attitudinal Items about Sexuality, Race, and Gender 
Variable Metric 
M 
(SD) 
Sexuality Attitudes   
Warmth toward gay men and lesbian women 0 = very cold or unfavorable 
feeling, 50 = no feeling at all, 100 
= very warm or favorable feeling 
51.95 
(27.82) 
   
Perceived amount of homophobic discrimination in the 
US today  
0 = none at all, 2 = moderate 
amount, 4 = a great deal 
2.56 
(1.07) 
   
View on legal recognition of same-sex relationships 0 = no recognition, 1 = civil unions 
only, 2 = marriage 
1.16 
(.80) 
   
Believe that gay or lesbian couples should be legally 
permitted to adopt children 
0 = no, 1 = yes .64 
(.48) 
   
Race Attitudes   
Favor allowing universities to increase number of Black 
students by considering race in choosing students 
0 = oppose a great deal, 3 = 
neither, 6 = favor a great deal 
1.95 
(1.86) 
   
Favor allowing companies to increase number of Black 
workers by considering race when choosing employees 
0 = oppose a great deal, 3 = 
neither, 6 = favor a great deal 
1.81 
(1.83) 
   
Perceived amount of racist discrimination in the US 
today  
0 = none at all, 2 = moderate 
amount, 4 = a great deal 
2.09 
(1.02) 
   
Whites have too much little influence in American 
politics 
0 = too little, 1 = just about the 
right amount, 2 = too much 
1.18 
(.59) 
   
Blacks have too little influence in American politics 0 = too much, 1 = just about the 
right amount, 2 = too little 
1.16 
(.66) 
   
Warmth toward Blacks 0 = very cold or unfavorable 
feeling, 50 = no feeling at all, 100 
= very warm or favorable feeling 
64.72 
(22.10) 
   
How often feel sympathy for Blacks 0 = never, 2 = about half of the 
time, 4 = always  
1.27 
(1.05) 
   
How often feel admiration for Blacks 0 = never, 2 = about half of the 
time, 4 = always  
1.49 
(1.07) 
   
How hardworking Blacks are 0 = extremely lazy, 3 = neither 
lazy nor hardworking, 6 = 
extremely hardworking 
3.04 
(1.42) 
   
How intelligent Blacks are 0 = extremely unintelligent, 3 = 
neither unintelligent nor 
intelligent, 6 = extremely 
intelligent 
3.42 
(1.33) 
(Continued on next page.)
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(Appendix B continued from previous page.) 
Variable Metric 
M 
(SD) 
Racial resentment scale (=.80): belief that (1) Blacks 
are not worse off than whites because they do not work 
hard enough, (2) Blacks have gotten less than they 
deserve, (3) Blacks should not have to work their way 
up without special favors to overcome prejudice, and (4) 
generations of slavery and discrimination made it 
difficult for Blacks to work their way out of the lower 
class 
0 = strongly disagree with all four 
statements, 8 = midpoint, 16 = 
strongly agree with all four 
statements 
5.85 
(6.16) 
   
Gender Attitudes   
How good it be for the US to have a woman president in 
next 20 years 
0 = extremely bad, 3 = neither, 6 = 
extremely good  
3.80 
(1.49) 
   
How much easier is it for working mothers to establish 
warm and secure relationships with their children  
0 = a great deal harder, 3 = neither, 
6 = a great deal easier 
1.74 
(1.28) 
   
It is worse for the family if the man works outside of the 
home and the woman takes care of the home and family 
0 = much better, 3 = makes no 
difference, 6 = much worse 
1.99 
(1.44) 
   
Perceived amount of sexist discrimination in the US 
today  
0 = none at all, 2 = moderate 
amount, 4 = a great deal 
1.76 
(.96) 
   
How serious a problem is sexist discrimination in the US 0 = not a problem at all, 4 = 
extremely serious problem 
1.68 
(.94) 
   
How often do employers discriminate against women in 
making decisions about hiring and promotion 
0 = never, 2 = about half of the 
time, 4 = always 
1.36 
(.79) 
   
Men have more opportunities to achieve than women 0 = women have many more, 3 = 
equal, 6 = men have many more 
4.13 
(1.37) 
   
The news media should pay more attention to sexist 
discrimination 
0 = a great deal less, 3 = same 
amount, 6 = a great deal more 
3.44 
(1.57) 
   
Perceived frequency that women demand equality, not 
special favors these days 
0 = always seek special favors, 4 = 
never seek special favors 
2.78 
(.96) 
   
Perceived frequency that women cause more problems 
than they solve when complaining about discrimination 
0 = always cause more problems, 4 
= never cause more problems 
2.54 
(.95) 
   
View on legal restrictions against abortion 0 = abortion should never be 
permitted, 3 = a woman should 
always be able to obtain an 
abortion as a matter of personal 
choice 
1.95 
(1.08) 
   
Legalized abortion scale (=.88): favor abortion if (1) 
staying pregnant would hurt woman’s health, (2) staying 
pregnant would cause woman to die, (3) pregnancy was 
caused by incest, (4) pregnancy was caused by rape, (5) 
fetus will be born with a serious birth defect, (6) having 
0 = greatly oppose abortion in 
seven circumstances, 28 = 
midpoint, 56 = greatly favor 
abortion in all seven circumstances 
34.12 
(15.84) 
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the child would be extremely difficult financially, and 
(7) woman chooses to have an abortion 
 
